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The impact of environmental factors on the measurement of 
managerial efficiency in the Italian waste management sector. 
Framework and empirical evidence. 
The public and private sectors are different in terms of ownership, funding and 
control. The degree of publicness influences the decision-making processes, 
strategies, and actions, thus severely impacting performance levels. This study 
contributes to the existing literature on managerial efficiency environmental 
factors by proposing a framework and methodology for estimating the influence 
of the “publicness effect.” A new method is tested, relying on the combined 
integration of three different DEA models in the Italian waste management 
sector. Results show that the “publicness effect” accounts for 33.87% of 
managerial efficiency for public companies and 11.6% for mixed ones. 
Keywords: efficiency, publicness effect, DEA, waste management, 
environmental factor 
Introduction 
The New Public Management reforms introduced a new market approach to public 
sector management, favouring the externalisation of public services through different 
governance forms of governance: private corporations, outsourcing, public-private 
partnerships, and privatisation (Doherty & Horne, 2002; Torres & Pina, 2002; 
DexiaCrediop, 2004; Reichard, 2007; Keune et al., 2008). In particular, the goal of 
externalisation is to improve performance in the provision of public services, increase 
service quality and lower costs. In order to meet these expectations and goals, it 
becomes critically important for each partner to define which type of governance form 
should be involved (Broadbent et al., 2003; Rosenau, 2000; Noto & Bianchi, 2015).  
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The externalisation process led by the recent spending review trends is pushing 
governments to enhance efficiency while using the best optimization level for resources 
compared to the public services provided (Levine, 1978; Pandey, 2010). Consequently, 
the need to deliver and demonstrate value for money in public services will continue to 
be reinforced (Van Dooren et al., 2010) and well-managed performance measurement 
systems are critical for accurately and systematically demonstrating operational 
accountability in governmental organizations (Bianchi & Rivenbark, 2014). 
Several scholars have focused their studies on externalisation and on how private sector 
involvement in public services has led to the creation of new mixed forms of 
organization, which has made a clear difference in terms of performance. Noticeably, 
the most common dimension of organizational performance, as highlighted by empirical 
studies, is efficiency, while the ownership structure (public, private and mixed public-
private) of the public service provider offers the governance variable. 
In order to add hands-on value to theories, it is necessary to have a deep understanding 
of public, private, and mixed organizations and to allow for the key characteristics of 
public services. Some authors find that the differences between the public and private 
sector, in terms of ownership, funding, and control, are significant and that these 
differences affect decision processes, strategies, and actions (Nutt, 2000; Boyne 2002), 
thus influencing the level of performance reached in terms of efficiency.  
The purpose of this study is to focus on the governance-performance relationship, 
highlighting how the public dimension, considered as an environmental factor 
(identified here as the “publicness effect”) has a prominent role in determining the 
inefficiency of organizational performance. To evaluate the measurement of 
organizational performance (managerial efficiency), a set of scores for input-specific 
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efficiency levels has been developed, using the Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) 
(Charnes et al., 1978; Fare et al., 1978) non-parametric technique in a modified Slack 
Based Measure (SBM), (Tone, 2001; 2010) version. This study tested the waste 
management provision in Italy. It analysed 64 companies that provided waste 
management services for the year 2010. Public, private, and mixed companies are all 
players in the waste management sector. Furthermore, as shown by several previous 
studies (Nutt, 2000; Boyne, 2002), it is reasonable to agree on the fact that variables 
such as publicness and all the ensuing characteristics in terms of goals, structure, and 
value, are able to affect the efficiency of the managerial process. In order to neutralize 
the “publicness effect” on the evaluation of efficiency, the “degree of privatisation” 
variable has been treated as “special input.” In this variable, the “publicness effect” and 
degree of privatisation are inversely proportional to each other, or rather, as the public 
dimension increases, the degree of privatisation diminishes, and vice versa. In DEA 
jargon the degree of privatisation is seen as non-discretional input, in the sense that it is 
a factor of production but at the same time is out of the manager's control. It is, to all 
intents and purposes, an environmental factor. Another way to see it is in terms of an 
environmental factor influencing performance. By treating the degree of privatisation as 
non-discretional input, the model makes it possible to estimate efficiency by monitoring 
it, thus monitoring the “publicness effect.” To the best of our knowledge, this is the first 
application of a non-discretional DEA model for isolating the “publicness effect” in the 
evaluation of efficiency. 
The article is organized as follows: the literature review provides the theoretical 
framework; the second part on data and methodology explains the research 
methodology and describes data sources along with the details of the construction of 
variables. Finally, the empirical findings, discussion, and concluding remarks are 
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presented in results and conclusions.  
Literature review 
The aim of this section is to define “performance” and explain the main theories of 
governance in order to understand the link between corporate ownership and corporate 
performance in terms of efficiency. Later, it is demonstrated that the environmental 
variable (publicness effect), as an intrinsic company feature, is able to affect the 
corporate governance mechanisms and management systems which, in turn, can 
influence the decision-making activities and, consequently, managerial efficiency. In 
particular, it is the fact of being public that, due to its characteristics, hampers the 
managerial operations.  
The much-quoted definition of performance coined by Campbell et al. (1993) states that 
“Performance is what the organization hires one to do, and do well”. 
In the literature, a number of authors have conceptualized performance by 
distinguishing an aspect of action (the quality of action) from an aspect of the outcome 
(the quality of the achievement) in relation to performance (Campbell, 1990; Campbell 
et al., 1993; Sonnentag & Frese, 2002; Dubnick, 2005; Van Dooren et al., 2010). By 
relying on these two different aspects of performance, Dubnick (2005) differentiates 
between four perspectives of performance, and defines, among others, performance as 
productivity or operational efficiency “the ratio of output to input for a given 
production unit under given conditions, (i.e. the production function),” this approach to 
performance elevates both the quality of the actions as well as the achievements. 
As Van Dooren et al. (2010) pointed out, outputs and efficiency in the public sector are 
still inadequate because of the lack of effects in society and because the maximization 
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of profits is not a primary goal (even if it should be) of the public sector organizations 
(Bouckaert & Halligan, 2008). Nevertheless, attention to output is equally significant 
for the public sector in order to evaluate their output mix and to discover whether the 
supply of public services is accurate (Van Dooren et al., 2010), effective, and efficient. 
Boyne (2010) argues that public sector organizations are likely to be judged as 
performing well if their stakeholders believe that they are producing not only the right 
results (e.g. high scores on performance indicators), but that they are doing this in the 
right way. 
Skelcher (2008), conceptualizing performance in public services and identifying the 
organizational performance of public service entities, focuses on efficiency, 
effectiveness, productivity, service quality, and compliance with legal norms. The 
measurement of the efficiency of public service provision and the identification of 
optimal operational and business models have become major concerns of policy-makers 
and scholars. In particular, several scholars have focused their efforts on understanding 
what influences the typology of ownership and how the corporate governance system 
may affect efficiency. 
Corporate governance focuses on the governance relationship between the shareholder 
and the company managers. Within this relationship, the interests of the shareholders 
and managers may vary and these dissimilarities are reflected in decisions, which 
consequently may have an influence on corporate performance. Corporate governance 
as a system consists of a set of governance mechanisms managed, where admissible, by 
shareholders in order to control and direct the managers’ behaviour (decisions), thus 
influencing corporate performance. 
Significantly, the governance models indicate that governance-performance causality is 
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complex (Skelcher, 2008) and performance itself can influence the governance 
arrangements. The issue of causality is crucial in corporate governance-performance 
research because without a strong causal link there is no basis for suggesting that 
governance influences performance, rather than vice versa. Amid the corporate 
governance literature, there is no consensus on the nature of the causality in the 
governance-performance relationship (Love, 2010), leaving this issue open for further 
research. Skelcher (2008) argues the implicit assumption in public services reform 
initiatives, stating that “changes to governance arrangements will impact positively on 
performance outcomes”. 
Several theories (e.g. agency theory, stewardship theory and stakeholder theory) 
covered insight into the role of governance, whereas others, in determining 
performance, referred to the ownership structure (public choice theory, property rights 
theory, transaction cost theory, industrial organization theory). 
The Public Choice Theory (Tullock, 1965; Niskanen, 1968; Ostrom & Ostrom, 1971; 
Stretton & Orchard, 1994; Niskanen, 1971; Boyne, 1998; Iovitu & Bran, 2015) suggests 
a comprehensive understanding of the link between corporate governance, ownership 
(the “hard” governance attributes), and corporate performance (e.g. efficiency), 
implying that the governance experiences its own agency problems. According to this 
theory, publicly-owned companies are relatively less efficient than private ones because 
in publicly-owned companies the managers put their own goals before company 
efficiency. 
Another theory that allows a comprehensive understanding of the link between 
corporate governance, ownership, and corporate performance is the Property Rights 
Theory (Alchian, 1965; Demsetz, 1967; De Alessi, 1983; Asher et al., 2005).This theory 
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assumes that ownership leads to greater efficiency within the company. Owners are 
motivated to perform efficiently because it is in their own best interests to do so. They 
will aim to retain profits, convert company assets and sell shares in order to gain the 
greatest possible economic advantage. They are bound to look for the highest level of 
benefit, and this means increased business efficiency. Indeed, private ownership makes 
companies relatively more efficient than those owned publicly because their owners will 
benefit personally from anything that improves company efficiency and profitability. 
When compared to the property rights and public choice theories, the transaction cost 
theory is more aware of the nature of the service, the market and the contracting 
process. Private companies see an increase in efficiency when transaction costs are low, 
whilst monopoly markets where transaction costs are relatively high show no difference 
in efficiency. 
Lastly, the industrial organization theory stresses the relevance of the relationship 
between incentives and ownership that may cause an efficiency discrepancy, under a 
given market structure, among private and public companies. Hence, and according to 
Bel et al. (2010), private ownership is to be preferred when (1) the owners' time and 
money devoted to the business provides the necessary information for supervision, (2) 
firms are exposed to takeover, and (3) they face bankruptcy risks.  
With respect to the property rights and public choice theories, it is plausible that private 
companies outperform public ones. By contrast, the transaction cost and industrial 
organization theories emphasise the circumstance that the ownership structure impact 
on corporate performance relies on the nature of the sector that the firms are working in. 
Furthermore, when transaction costs are relatively higher and in the presence of 
monopoly markets, it is reasonable that private companies do not outperform public 
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ones. 
Nevertheless, the theoretical perspective outlined herein has led the debate about 
whether privately-owned companies are more efficient than publicly-owned ones 
because of the significant and current role of the relationship between governance and 
performance. Empirical studies indicate that private sector participation in public 
services has generally improved their efficiency (as suggested by property rights and 
public choice theory). However, the effects largely depend on the industry (e.g. level of 
competition, existence of a natural monopoly, size of municipality in terms of 
inhabitants) and organisational consequences of publicness.  
Studies in the waste management sector alongside with their empirical results found 
evidence supporting the theory that private companies outperformed public ones 
(Kitchen, 1976; Collins & Downes, 1977; Tickner & McDavid, 1986; Cubbin et al., 
1987; Reeves & Barrow, 2000; Moore et al., 2005). Other researchers also indicate an 
improvement in efficiency after privatisation (Whorthington & Dollary, 2001; Dijkgraaf 
& Gradus, 2007). Some researchers however show any improvement in overall 
efficiency (Bosch et al., 2001; Sanchez, 2008; Bel & Costas, 2006; Warner, 2012) yet a 
few others provide information on greater efficiency by public companies. (Dubin & 
Navarro, 1988; Ohlsson, 2003; Benito et al., 2010). In fact, while the trend is in favour 
of privatisation, the debate on the influence of ownership is still ongoing and open to 
contribution. As previously noted, the level of efficiency is influenced by the nature of 
ownership, ie, it is largely dependent on the organisational consequences of publicness, 
or rather the environmental factor that is called “publicness effect.”  
In fact, there are limitations on the managerial role and constraints are placed by 
politicians on resources decision and policy boundaries with the exception of companies 
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that are able to develop and operate in full market conditions, with high revenue levels. 
The fundamental distinction between public and private organisations lies in their 
subordination to political power being the private business driven and not politically 
driven. Public management is also the custodian of factors that are unique to public 
organisations as well as being very distinct from private management. These unique 
features envelop the legal framework, such as politician control, the relative open 
market, and their whose accountability, from different perspectives (not only legal 
accountability, but also political). Undergoing several public control measures, public 
organisation is in a different position when considering managerial structures and styles 
(Horton & Farnham, 1999). In addition, a public organisation sometimes has a close, 
but weak, connection to other independent public organisations, as their policies can 
either positively or negatively affect the implementation of its organisational change 
programmes. (Bianchi, 2010). 
Management of a public organisation or private market-driven company is not identical. 
In fact, managing resources for public services is more customer-driven as it allows 
managers to lead financial and staff decisions. Business oriented private companies 
satisfy consumer demand, as a means of making profit, while the public sector tends to 
satisfy political demand in order to achieve social stability and political integration.  
with outputs being more quality and effortlessly estimate in the public domain. 
As Boyne pointed out (2002), there are some typical variables of public organisations, 
which are able to influence managerial practices and consequently their efficiency. 
There is more bureaucracy and red tape, fewer materialistic public managers and 
weaker organisational commitment. 
More bureaucracy: organisations in the public sector follow more formal procedures for 
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decision-making and are less flexible and more risk-averse than their private sector 
counterparts (Bozeman & Kingsley, 1998; Farnham & Horton, 1996). These 
characteristics of public agencies reflect “the lack of rewards or incentives for 
successful innovations and the penalties for violation of established procedures” 
(Fottler, 1981). Bureaucratic structures may also stem from the requirements of 
monitoring bodies and demands for accountability in the public sector. As Rainey et al. 
(1976) point out, “the coercive nature of most government actions might be cited as a 
fundamental justification for constitutional checks and balances and extensive formal 
control mechanisms.” 
More red tape: this has often been viewed as a pathological bureaucratic side effect 
(Bozeman & Scott, 1996). The existence of red tape implies an unnecessary and 
counter-productive obsession with rules rather than results and with processes instead of 
outcomes. Bozeman et al. (1992) argue that “just as the original annoyance with red 
tape resulted from the delay caused by untying and tying the tape surrounding (official) 
documents, red tape today refers not to rules and procedures themselves but to the 
delays and subsequent irritation caused by formalization and stagnation.” 
The beliefs agree on lower levels of organisational commitment within the public sector, 
largely because of the inflexibility of personnel procedures and the weak link between 
performance and rewards. Perry and Porter (1982) note that “it is especially difficult for 
many public agencies to instil employees with a sense of personal significance.” One 
reason is that it is often difficult for public employees to see any link between their 
contribution and the success of their organisations. The absence of this link is the result 
of a variety of factors, including the sheer size of many governments, the pluralistic 
policy implementation networks, and the lack of clear-cut performance indicators or 
norms. 
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This framework led us to the core and aim of research on estimating the influence of the 
“publicness effect” as an environmental factor on managerial efficiency. This, in turn, 
led us to this research question: 
RQ: To what extent is managerial inefficiency in the Italian waste sector due to the 
“publicness effect?” 
Methodology   
Sector 
The waste management sector is selected in order to assess the “publicness effect” on 
managerial efficiency. The Italian waste management sector is where public, private, 
and mixed players operate together.  
Despite the implementation of the NPM reform of the waste management sector in 
Italy, most local public services are still managed by public-owned enterprises and, 
specifically, in 2012, 53% of these kinds of companies were still wholly or largely 
public owned (Ministero dello Sviluppo Economico, 2015). From a regulatory point of 
view, the inclusion into the Italian legislative framework of integrated waste 
management principles issued by the EU relies on legal provisions that date back to 
1991. In fact, up to that time the legislator allowed Italian local authorities a form of 
urban waste management, which provided after the phase of “collection,” only the 
“disposal.” Municipal waste has been consider a residual economic activity. In 1997 the 
Legislative Decree n. 22 (a.k.a "Ronchi Decree") came into force followed in 2006 by 
the Legislative Decree n. 152 that profoundly changed the national legislation and gave 
way to the recent amendment of Legislative Decree n. 205 of 2010. At EU level, 
regulations like the “self-executing” (e.g. import-export waste, “end of waste” etc.) 
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supports the national framework with direct application rules. The Public 
Administration provides rules on individual operators’ conduct, but its involvement is 
mainly limited to including clauses in tenders aimed at increasing the technical skills in 
the prevention of waste generation field (i.e. government’s role is to address and overall 
coordinate the sector). While leading the operational level, local authorities release 
specific provisions which can cause an extremely atomised, confused and opaque 
operational framework. Local authorities may also outsource the services to private and 
mixed companies through tenders and direct awards. 
 
Data and Methodology 
This analysis covers 64 Italian companies that provided services for Italian cities in 
2010 (it is only one year for which a census was conducted). This database integrates 
three different sources of data: Ministero dello Sviluppo Economico (2015), AIDA-
Bureau Van Dijk (2015) and SOSE (2015). There are 36 public, 23 mixed, and 5 private 
companies. The efficiency measurement involves choosing the concepts of efficiency, 
the estimation method and the definition of inputs and outputs. This study applies the 
Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) methodology, which is a linear programming 
technique introduced by Charnes et al. (1978), which relies on Farrell’s work (1957)
1
. 
DEA’s measure of efficiency reflects whose ability to produce maximum output at 
minimum cost.  
Table 1 (below) shows the descriptive statistics of the sample. It shows the size in terms 
                                                
1 The main reason for the use of Efficiency Frontier Techniques like DEA lies in requirement of 
the smallest number of observations and takes into account simultaneously multiple inputs 
and outputs, compared to ratios where one input is related to one output each time 
(Thanassoulis et al., 1996).  
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of inhabitants (population), municipalities where the sample companies operate, degree 
of privatisation and costs for providing the service.  
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics of the Sample (2010). 
Table 2 shows the degree of privatisation of the sample. Mixed companies are split into 
three categories which are: mixed public where the share of participation is irrelevant 
(under 20%), mixed with level of privatisation between 20 and 45%, and finally the 
private mixed where the private participation rate - although sometimes not a majority - 
presumes the de facto control of the private counterpart
2
. 
Table 2. Companies sample as per privatisation rate. 
Table 3 outlines the input-outputs variables. The input is the costs of services 
delivering; the outputs are in terms of physical production. 
Table 3. Input - Output Variables (2010). 
In order to achieve the intended goal, is assumed (in agreement with existing literature) 
that the type of ownership influences efficiency (Kitchen, 1976; Collins & Downes, 
1977; Tickner & McDavid, 1986; Cubbin et al., 1987; Reeves & Barrow, 2000; Moore 
et al., 2005). Therefore, in order to estimate efficiency due to management it treats 
privatisation as an environmental factor to control. The model allows for consistent 
performance comparison as the comparison is made between firms operating in the 
same environment (the same rate of privatisation).  
From a methodological perspective, the Banker and Morey (1986) approach is followed 
                                                
2 subdivision made on the combined basis of specific legal frameworks provide by the Italian 
Civil Code, Authority specific regulatory provisions for the Italian stock exchange and 
European directives and regulations relating to high sensitive market sectors. 
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with a modification of the standard Baker and Morey (1986) model by integrating it 
with the SBM model put forward by Tone (2010). The result is the combination and 
integration of the Banker and Morey (1986) and Tone (2001) models, already proposed 
by Patrizii, Resce (2013), and the SBM introduced by Tone (2010). The advantage of 
our innovation relies on taking into account the mix inefficiency in addition to the 
technical one (Farrell, 1957), and at the same time not overestimating the inefficiency as 
cited by Tone (2010).  
DEA literature labels environmental variables as non-discretional because they are 
impossible to be kept under management control. In our model, the non-discretional 
variables are used technically to select the benchmark frontier, but not to estimate 
inefficiency3. Depending on whether the marginal effect on production is respectively 
good or bad, they are considered non-discretionary output or input in DEA evaluations. 
In our case study, since following the Sec. Literature review, privatisation has a positive 
impact on production, but it is not in the discretionary power of management, the share 
of privatisation is treated a non-discretional input in the evaluation. Therefore, the 
enucleated integrated approach allows us to take advantage of the SBM as modified by 
Tone (2010) while treating the non-discretionary inputs as suggested by Banker and 
Morey (1986).  
Like other standard DEA models, our method measures inefficiency as a distance 
                                                
3
 Banker and Morey method does not pursue to reduce all the inputs but only the sub-vector 
formed by discretionary inputs; simultaneously it compares each DMU only with those 
DMUs with an equal or lower value for the corresponding non-discretionary input. It is 
also important to underline that when referring to researches facing the non-discretionary 
variables problems, as suggested by Huguenin J.M. (2015) and Harrison et al. (2012), 
since there is no DEA model that is clearly superior in controlling for non-discretionary 
inputs, the majority of researchers continue to refer to the Banker and Morey (1986) work.  
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between the firm and the frontier. The peculiarity of our frontier to be the linear 
combination of the firms using less input, producing more output, and with a rate of 
privatisation equal or less favourable than the firm under evaluation. The advantage of 
the SBM method is the opportunity to take each single variable’s inefficiency into 
account while also detecting mix (Tone, 2001) and technical inefficiencies (Farrel, 
1957). After making the alteration proposed by Tone (2010), the SBM method measures 
efficiency by projecting the firm on the nearest point of the frontier. Therefore, the 
resulting index of efficiency is not underestimated.  
Following on from Tone’s idea (2010), our algorithm is structured into two stages. In 
the first, it identifies the frontier by applying a standard SBM as modified in Patrizii, 
Resce (2013). The linear programme for firm k is4: 
    
min = 	 − 

∑ 




	 + 

∑ 



 = 1
	 = ∑ 

 −  
!
	"
#$ ≥ ∑ "
#$


	"
$ = ∑ "

 + &
	, (, )*, & ≥ 0
   (1) 
It uses: n to indicate the number of firms (64); ,$ the number of discretional inputs (1); 
  the number of outputs (4); - the outputs vector	(4 × 1); 3* the discretionary input 
scalar; 34* the non-discretionary inputs scalar;	5 is the input slack times 	; )! is the 
vector (4 × 1) of output slack times 	. As reported by Patrizii and Resce (2013), the 
model is peculiar because this evaluation only relies on discretionary variables.  
                                                
4The same linearisation is present in Tone (2001). In (1) all variables are multiplied by		. 
Although there are just 5 private firms, in (1) it assesses 64 firms, 4 outputs and 1 input, 
this is well above the minimum firms/variables suggested by Dyson et al. (2001). 
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The third condition regards non-discretionary variables and ensures that the efficiency 
frontier works with non-discretionary variables equal, or less favourable, to those firms 
under evaluation. Model (1) allows the reference set (6) detection of the 7 DMU (the 
reference set is the firms on the frontier): 
6 = 89|
∗ > 0; 9 = 1,… , ?	@ 
It is important to underline that in 6 there are no firms operating with a more 
favourable environment compared to firm	7. The reference set is then used to find the 
minimum distance from the frontier, i.e. an optimistic measure of efficiency like:  
    
maxCD = 	 − 

∑ 




	 + 

∑ 



 = 1
	-E = ∑ -F∈H − )
!
	3E
* = ∑ 3F∈H + 5
	, (,  $, & ≥ 0
   (2) 
With the given level of non-discretionary inputs, the CD index gives a measure of the 
average reduction of discretionary inputs and a measure of the average increase of 
outputs necessary to reach efficiency. The CD index in (2) considers constant returns 
of scale (CRS). It takes both the managerial and scale inefficiency into account. As 
Banker et al. (1984) suggests, in order to define the scale returns, it is necessary to 
evaluate the value ∑ in (2): if ∑ < 	, the firm works under increasing returns of 
scale; if ∑ = 	, the firm operates under constant returns of scale; if  ∑ > 	 the firm 
works under decreasing returns of scale. It obtain the index of managerial efficiency by 
using the variable return to scale (VRS) linear model, which formally adds the 
convexity condition ∑ = 	 to the programme (1). 
From the results of the CRS and VRS versions, the total inefficiency is break down into 
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two parts: one depends on management (1 − JHK) and the other one caused by the 
firm dimensions, the scale inefficiency	(JHK − LHK). 
Results  
The results obtained from the SBM model efficiency esteem application, as proposed by 
Tone (2010 version), are shown in the following figures. 
Figure 1 shows the measures of technical efficiency, managerial and scale inefficiency 
organised into five categories of companies and identified by degree of privatisation, 
obtained by treating privatisation as a control factor. With the same input level, 
increasing privatisation leads to greater quantity of outputs. 
Measuring technical or operational efficiencies is the first essential step for any type of 
economic evaluation. In fact, it can understand whether the use of resources in the 
production process performs well or if improvement is possible by eliminating potential 
squanders. 
There is evidence that, in terms of total efficiency, privatisation increases companies’ 
abilities to enhance their performance. Low levels of efficiency are likely to depend on 
“bad” managers’ behaviour or incorrect company size (too big or too small) that does 
not allow them optimal organisation. 
Therefore, it calculates scale efficiency and managerial inefficiency in order to make 
judgment in terms of “economy/diseconomies of scale” and evaluate managerial 
performance. The inefficiency scale appears to show a positive link to public 
management. Public companies reach such a size where they began to experience scale 
diseconomies: further increase in available resources can produce less proportional 
increase in output; consequently the unit production cost increases. In fact, in terms of 
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managerial inefficiency (orange rectangle) privatisation seems to unexpectedly have a 
negative effect on performance. In fact, as Anderson (2000) states, in a natural 
monopoly, the economies of scale meant firms oriented their trends towards raising 
production costs more than whatever can be gained from efficiency and competition. 
Managerial commitment is varied in each unit because it depends on diverse factors like 
managers’ personalities, environmental pressure, information available, or personal 
opportunistic reasons, for not providing the best working efforts. That is, all these 
reasons represent the link to measuring managerial inefficiency. Contrary to expected 
common beliefs, public managers should provide the best managerial performance. 
 
Figure 1. Efficiency results with the application after having applied of the standard 
SBM Model.5 
 
In order to answer the RQ, the linear models (1) and (2) allow the splits of the 
managerial efficiency detected with a standard SBM Tone (2010) into discretional and 
non-discretional. Because the non-discretional input is privatisation, this is named non-
discretional “publicness effect.” It is the measurement of how managerial inefficiency 
cannot be put down to a bad manager, but the public sector and all the limitations that it 
imposes on management. In Figure 2 the total managerial inefficiency showed, in 
Figure 1 is split into managerial and “publicness effects.”  
As expected, public managers increase performance when the “publicness effects” 
environmental factor is isolated. This effectively allows comparing their operational 
                                                
5 Following Färe, Karagiannis (2014) this is an index of efficiency average, weighted for the 
costs. 
Page 18 of 34
URL: http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/lpad  Email: afarazma@fau.edu
International Journal of Public Administration
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review Only
 19
work with the management running companies with a higher degree of privatisation. 
Mixed-public managers do not show an improvement because they already had the best 
performance. Performance increases considerably for mixed firms. 
Figure 2. The “publicness effect” and managerial inefficiency6 
 
However, this study focuses on managerial inefficiency by trying to determine how 
“guilty” managers are and whether it depends on real management activities and 
policies, leadership style, or different types of decision-making processes. In detail, it’s 
founded that the “publicness effect” accounts for 33.9% of managerial efficiency for 
public companies and 11.6% for mixed ones. 
Figure 3 shows the optimal scale of production and dimensions. On the ordinate axe in 
the graph the inhabitants served are considered, the black square is the “optimal” size 
(64,577.71), and the rectangle is the interval between the minimum and maximum city 
for each category of privatisation. 
 
Figure 3. Return to scale in the Italian waste management sector. 
 
Figure 3 also  clearly shows the relationship between privatisation and municipality 
sizes. In fact, companies show that the more “private” they are (meaning, for the 
specific case, the trend direction scale oriented from public to private through the 
mixed) and the closer their size is to the optimal one. This can be interpreted as the 
                                                
6 Following Färe, Karagiannis (2014) this is an index of efficiency average, weighted for the 
costs. 
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private investor’s volition to avoid problems of economy/diseconomy of scale. 
In order to add some curiosity and attention to investigation details, the following 
Figure 4 and 5 highlight the minutia costs of being public, both for public and mixed 
firms  due to the considered variables, where it is possible to point out that the public 
managers faces with higher costs. On the other hand, when only referring to 
“expenditures,” mixed company managers deal with higher costs.  
 
Figure 4. The details of “publicness effect” (for Public Firms). 
 
 
Figure 5. The details of “publicness effect” (for Mixed Firms). 
 
Once again the graphs show evidence that those firms facing higher costs are public 
with obviously public managers having to face greater problems. 
Conclusions 
In accordance with existing literature, the efficiency analysis has clearly shown that 
involving the private sector in the ownership of waste service provision - either as 
stand-alone companies or public sector partners – enhances efficiency in the waste 
sector. However, not only is the kind of ownership relevant when considering 
improving efficiency, it is also essential to take several other contextual and 
environmental factors into account. The study highlighted that as an environmental 
factor “publicness effect” significantly impacts on the level of managerial efficiency. In 
fact, it accounts for 33.9% of managerial efficiency for public companies and 11.6% for 
mixed ones. Scholars that investigate organisational performance have always 
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concentrated on investigating managers’ aptitude to dealing with resources that they are 
able to control, without taking environmental factors into account. These factors cannot 
be controlled, but heavily impact the performance level reached.  
Managers of public-sector entities must take a multiplicity of stakeholders with 
heterogeneous needs and features into consideration, all of which could potentially 
influence their decision-making processes. Strategies and actions are also significantly 
constrained, shaped and affected by political orientation, rhythms and incentives. So the 
“publicness effect” represents an intrinsic component of a company and an 
environmental effect that managers can’t control although they can influence 
managerial decisions and consequently the company’s performance in terms of 
efficiency.  
This study has shown that “publicness effect” is able to influence the efficiency 
measurement. For the first time, is isolated the “publicness effect” and proposed itself 
as a reference framework for assessing managerial activities. 
 This framework is based on the fact that unveiling the effects of being a Public 
company on the efficiency level is arguably a difficult exercise because of the being 
public is not only a simple choice and many public companies, for many and different 
reason as for many other external factors, will never become mixed or private.  
Evidence also indicates that economies of scale are a relevant economical factor. In fact, 
this study provides findings on the fact that many waste service operators, mostly public 
and mixed owned companies, should reduce their operational size in order to increase 
their operational efficiency. The unexpected result of this empirical study shows that the 
managerial inefficiency level - contrary to what one might expect and according to 
existing literature - is higher in private companies than in public owned ones.  
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In addition, the waste management sector is a de facto service performed in a market of 
a natural monopolistic nature (therefore, not truly competitive), private companies 
apparently and prima facie appear to achieve better performance which means that 
private companies are able to show a size close to the optimal one. On the other hand, 
the municipal waste collection service is actually exemplified by the presence of public 
companies when referring to a greater number of city inhabitants.  
Likewise, the research findings suggest that the rate of privatisation increases a 
company’s abilities to enhance its performance and that Public companies are paying a 
higher price due to their being public. That is, Public firms appear to face these kinds of 
costs while trying to meet multiple purposes and achieve a strategic balance by 
integrating public and commercial values. Given these results, it is possible to argue that 
public and mixed are not equivalent while privates apparently perform better. At the 
same time, however, they avoid multifaceted problems that can be caused by large cities 
as, from a managerial perspective, also by the “ball and chain” of being a public 
organisation.  
Lastly, the positive expectations effects from privatisation like gains in efficiency, 
users’ price reductions, quality services improvement, i vestments increase for 
maintenance, modernisation of systems and structures, are not always fully 
accomplished or are only partially. The positive effects are often real and perceptible in 
the short term and in some cases, were then downsized or invalidated in the medium to 
long term by market dynamics that led to the creation of private monopolies that are 
able to avoid elude actions in order to protect competition (Borgonovi, 2007).  
From our point of view, the results of this study, in order to achieve sound judgement 
about the benefits of every kind of corporate governance, adds significant and useful 
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information for managers and policy-maker.  It also highlights the necessity, when 
investigating the efficiency of companies characterised by a different ownership 
structure, to consider the environmental variables that are able to influence the 
managerial efficiency measure. By isolating these factors, this paper proposes a 
framework and reference method, which is applied here on the incidence of the public 
dimension. It refers to the Italian waste sector, but is possible to reply and apply to other 
sectors. In fact, this is a useful and replicable model for the operations evaluation of 
management. 
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The impact of environmental factors on the measurement of managerial 
efficiency in the Italian waste management sector. Framework and empirical 
evidence. 
 
 
Table 1, Descriptive Statistics of the Sample (2010). 
 
Min. Max Average 
Population (000) 28 (Mogliano Veneto) 2.761 (Rome) 167 
Rate of privatisation 0 (36 Municipalities) 100 (5 Municipalities) 23 
Costs (000) 356 (Schio) 630000 (Rome) 32059 
Sources: Ministero dello Sviluppo Economico (2015); AIDA-Bureau Van Dijk (2015); SOSE (2015) 
 
Table 2. Companies sample as for the privatisation rate.   
 
Rate of privatisation N. 
Public 0% 36 
Mixed – Public 0% - 20% 2 
Mixed 20% - 45% 11 
Mixed - Private 45% – 55% 10 
Private 100% 5 
Source: authors’ elaboration from AIDA-Bureau Van Dijk (2015) data 
 
 
 
 
 
Page 31 of 34
URL: http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/lpad  Email: afarazma@fau.edu
International Journal of Public Administration
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review Only
Table 3. Input - Output Variables (2010). 
  
 
  Average Median Std. Dev. 
Costs (000)  Input 32.059 9.688 87.202 
Manholes Cleaned  Output 15.350,58 4.368,00 133,61 
Deratting Interventions  Output 235,13 4.609,00 133,68 
Tons of Separate Waste Collected  Output 34.195,75 4.368,00 132,68 
Tons of Total Waste Collected  Output 101.644,98 4.273,50 131,58 
Source: authors’ elaboration from SOSE (2015) data 
 
Figure 1. Efficiency results with the application after having applied of the standard SBM Model. 
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Figure 2. The “publicness effect” and the managerial inefficiency 
 
 
Figure 3. Return to scale in the Italian waste management sector. 
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Figure 4. The details of “publicness effect” (for the Public Firms). 
 
 
Figure 5. The details of “publicness effect” (for the Mixed Firms). 
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